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Abstract: The purpose of this piece is to evaluate the overall pros and cons of the 
nationalisation and privatisation of the petroleum industry. According to Georg 
Erdmann (n/d), the economists assume that nationalized companies are usually less 
efficient than private companies. This belief has been confirmed by HARTLEY 
(2007) for the upstream oil industry. But we see today that governments tend to 
take over the control of oil, gas, uranium and power industries by restricting 
energy business rights in the company to national companies or by controlling the 
businesses of private companies by a significantly more restrictive regulation; 
whereas in the last two decades, many Governments did just the opposite when 
privatizing state energy companies. Nationalization of the petroleum industry is a 
pertinent topic for several reasons. Today, state owned companies hold around 85 
percent of oil and gas reserves (Erdmann, n/d). As of 2012, between 73 and 95 
percent of global oil reserves are controlled by national oil companies (NOCs) 
(Mahdavi, 2014). In fact, and according to Francisco Monaldi (2010), there are 
various factors leading countries to nationalize their petroleum industries, such as 
the civil society, regionalism, and the potential conservation and economic 
benefits from nationalizing the industry. According to Carneiro et al. (2003), 
deregulation of the oil and gas industry has led to privatization of the former state-
owned oil and gas companies, in several countries. As a result, the competitive 
environment has become more hostile. The changes of ownership, together with 
modification in the competitive environment, have caused significant 
modifications in the competitive strategies. Companies were not used to clear 
competitive strategies; but after privatization they started to follow clear patterns 
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of differentiation strategies while at the same time they seek cost parity in the 
industry. (Carneiro et al., 2003).The methodology for this paper was based only on 
literature review, with a view to improving our knowledge on the pros and cons of 
nationalisation and privatisation of the petroleum industry. We conclude that 
countries which  possess natural resources such as oil prefer to nationalize the 
companies in anticipation of  the high revenues that come with the high 
fluctuations of price of this commodity. Of course this fluctuation of prices is 
driven by some factors such as high demand of the resource and industrialization. 
The World Bank estimates that privatization is either under way or being planned 
in at least 50 countries. 
 
Keywords: Nationalisation, Privatisation, Evaluation, Pros and Cons. 
 
1. Introduction 
Nationalization and privatization are 
two very pertinent topics to discuss at 
the moment because with the price of 
oil increasing steadily since its collapse 
in 1998, oil is becoming a more 
expensive commodity and the 
organizational structure of that industry 
will always affect how it is extracted 
and distributed. 
The present essay is meant to approach 
in a very simple manner the issues of 
nationalisation and privatisation of 
companies in the Oil Industry, and in 
the perspective of evaluating the pros 
and cons of such government decisions 
in pursuit of either of the options. 
The structure used is also very simple, 
beginning with the conceptual 
framework of the main subjects: namely 
nationalisation and privatisation, from 
which we describe using a theoretical 
framework that leads to our 
methodology of study. In a comparison,   
two case studies will help us to bring up 
the pros and cons of each subject by 
way of evaluation as well as the 
implications of government decisions in 
such economic environment.  
 
 
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
Concept of Nationalization – refers to 
when a government takes control of a 
company or industry, which generally 
occurs without compensation for the 
loss of the net worth of seized assets and 
potential income. This action may be 
the result of: 
- A nation's attempt to consolidate 
power; 
- Reduction of foreign ownership of 
industries representing significant 
importance to local economies; or 
- To prop up failing industries. 
According to Monaldi (2010), 
nationalisation is the policy by which an 
asset is placed under state-control.On a 
time scale, nationalization phases in the 
oil industry correspond to periods of 
high crude prices and high revenues. 
(Erdmann, n/d). The author emphasises 
a higher degree of nationalization in 
extraction than in refining, which 
corresponds to the profitability 
differences along the value chain of the 
oil and gas industry. 
According to John Wirth (1985), state 
owned control is defined as the policy 
by which governments own, control, 
manage and exploit natural resources 
for national ends, in the name of 
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common good. Thus, in the definition 
alone, there is an implication of 
nationalization being for the benefit of 
the society as a whole. If one imagines a 
continuum of organisational structure, 
nationalisation and privatisation would 
be at opposite ends. 
However, nationalisation could include 
joint ventures where the state controls 
the industry but allows for private 
companies to participate in the resource 
extraction and retain some of the profit. 
It is also important to pay attention to 
the so-called creeping nationalisation; 
which is the impending threat of 
nationalisation before the policy is made 
official. This kind of nationalisation has 
not taken as drastic a form in the first 
two decades of the 21st century as 
outright expropriations have done in the 
1970’s, but it does seem highly 
prevalent. Actions indicative of 
creeping nationalisation include 
cumbersome labour and environmental 
regulations, taxation, and price and 
monetary controls. 
 
Nationalisation of the Petroleum 
Industry 
So why do leaders nationalize the oil 
industry? In line with a general utility-
maximizing theory, (Mahdavi, 2014) 
argues that leaders nationalize to 
maximize state revenues while 
minimizing costs. According to this 
author, the latter includes international 
retaliation and domestic political 
constraints. 
Using a novel longitudinal dataset on 
the establishment of national oil 
companies (NOCs), the empirical 
evidence presented in Mahdavi’s paper 
lends support to four primary findings. 
States are most likely to establish 
NOCs: 
- In periods of high oil prices, when 
the risks of expropriation are 
outweighed by the financial benefits; 
- In non-democratic systems, where 
executive constraints are limited; 
- In “waves”, that is, after other 
countries have nationalized, 
reflecting reduced likelihood of 
international retaliation; and, though 
with weaker empirical support, 
- In political settings marked by 
resource nationalism. 
 
Concept of Privatization 
When a government-owned business, 
operation, or property becomes owned 
by a private, non-government party. 
According to Moye Ajao (2008), from 
The Technical University of Berlin, 
privatization is the sale of state owned 
assets; or the transfer of a majority 
ownership of state-owned enterprises to 
the private sector by the sale of ongoing 
concerns or assets following liquidation. 
The author adds also that privatization 
refers to the sale of all or parts of a 
government’s equity in state-owned 
enterprises to the private sector. Define  
finally privatization as the divestiture by 
the state of enterprises, land or other 
assets. 
Privatisation of the Petroleum 
Industry 
According to Carneiro et al. (2003), in 
the oil industry, privatization represents 
a reversal of the nationalization 
processes that took place at the 
beginning of the last century, resulting 
from the advance of communist 
thinking and the restructuring of 
economies after the two World Wars. 
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Privatized firms, once accustomed to a 
predictable environment - monopolistic 
or tightly regulated - come face to face 
with the challenges and opportunities of 
increased competition. As a result, these 
companies change their attitude and 
attitude towards the market and 
competition in order to adapt to the new 
environment. 
 
Concept of Petroleum Industry 
Petroleum is considered a global 
commodity and the main reason of the 
development of the word we see today. 
It is considered the biggest Industry 
sector in the world in terms of capital 
investment and value, and also it 
products are used in almost all the areas 
of industrialization globally. In addition 
to that, drives thousands of hundreds 
workers worldwide, generating 
hundreds of billions of dollars globally 
each year. The Industry is divided 3 
categories or sectors named Upstream, 
Midstream and Downstream, and the 
companies operating in this industry are 
divided in NOC (National Oil 
Company’s) and IOC (International Oil 
Company’s) 
 
Concept of Profitability 
Profitability is a financial and economic 
concept originated from the word profit, 
used to measure or determine the 
efficiency, success or failure of a 
company or product. Some authors 
define profitability as a business's 
ability to produce a return on an 
investment based on its resources in 
comparison with an alternative 
investment. 
 
 
 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
Utility-Maximizing Theory 
Mahdavi (2014) is aligned with a 
general utility-maximizing theory, in 
which he argues that leaders nationalize 
assets to maximize state revenues while 
minimizing costs. 
Leaders nationalize to maximize state 
revenues while minimizing costs. The 
latter includes international retaliation 
and domestic political constraints. 
Using a novel longitudinal dataset on 
the establishment of National Oil 
companies (NOCs), the empirical 
evidence presented in this paper lends 
support to four primary findings state 
that States are most likely to establish 
NOCs: 
- In periods of high oil prices, when 
the risks of expropriation are 
outweighed by the financial benefits; 
- In non-democratic systems, where 
executive constraints are limited; 
- In “waves”, that is, after other 
countries have nationalized, 
reflecting reduced likelihood of 
international retaliation; and, though 
with weaker empirical support, 
- In political settings marked by 
resource nationalism. 
The Positive Theory of 
Nationalization 
Erdmann (2007) is aligned with the 
positive theory of nationalization; which 
emphasizes on “the basic business of 
politics, the transfer motive”; as well as 
the economic theory of firm. 
This theory is based on a similar interest 
of private investors and the State in the 
cash flow of firms, and does not 
necessarily assume inefficiency in the 
state owned firms, nor a sudden, 
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unexplained reversal in ideological 
preferences. Both private investors and 
the State are rational but their respective 
cost of capital can and will diverge over 
time, changing the private/public 
valuation ratio, the basic determinant of 
the exchange of firm ownership. Both 
the state and the private investors want 
to control firms in order to use their 
cash flows either for increasing the 
wealth of shareholders and managers, or 
for government consumption and 
transfers to politically influent 
clienteles. 
It also provides a view of the 
privatization and the nationalization 
waves, the possible reversals of policy 
from one to the other, as well as 
differences in the allocation of 
ownership between the public and the 
private across countries. Other local 
political variables can also influence 
these policies, to amplify or dampen 
them since they reflect the ultimate 
redistributive aims of the government. 
But that influence will only be effective 
as far as the privatization or the 
nationalization does not decrease the 
government’s overall resources. 
Otherwise, for instance, a government 
pursuing a nationalization policy in 
order to reduce unemployment, whereas 
the valuation ratio implies that the state 
valuation of firms is less than the 
private investors’ valuation (due to a 
higher public cost of capital), would 
implicitly be willing to overpay for the 
firms acquisition, thus accepting a loss 
of resources in the process (an 
unfavourable trade with private 
investors). This loss of resource, and the 
associated loss of political support that 
it determines, constitutes the 
opportunity cost of pursuing a political 
objective contrary to the rational, 
valuation ratio determined, policy of 
support maximization. The higher this 
opportunity cost, the lower the 
probability of a government following 
such an unconditional – or 
‘‘uneconomic’’ – strategy. 
 
Economic Theory 
Carneiro et al. (2003) also applied 
basically the economic theory of firm, 
emphasizing Porter’s competitive 
strategies; as well as economic 
regulation theory. 
Here the concept of “externality” is 
considered unnecessary and the 
advantage of “detrimental effects” is 
emphasized, which can be examined as 
any other factor of production. Coase is 
not in favor of State action, since it 
assumes that it is related to high costs, 
although it admits the possibility that 
“most externalities should be allowed to 
exist if we want to maximize the value 
of production”. In this sense, for Coase 
(1994, 27) the concept of externality 
imposes a governmental intervention 
(tax and regulation), even before that 
other options, such as non-action, 
abandonment of previous government 
action or simply the facilitation of 
commercial transactions, may be 
considered 
The new economy of regulation deals 
with the agency problem that arises as a 
consequence of an asymmetrical 
structure between the principal and the 
agent. In other words, regulation is an 
application of the principal-agent 
methodology in the contractual 
relationship between the regulator and 
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the regulated agent, as proposed by 
Laffont and Tirole (1994). The principal 
is the State (the regulatory agency) that 
does not have all the information and 
holds the property rights of an asset or 
the most relevant administrative 
function. The regulated agent is the 
operator of the service that administers 
the ownership of the assets and is 
therefore the part informed about the 
details of its specific contents (inputs, 
technology and cost structure). Thus, 
the problem of regulation is related to 
transaction costs, problems of political 
economy and incomplete information. 
Economic regulation has its origin in the 
need to control market failures 
(normative approach). However, when 
the State intervenes to correct these 
failures, some difficulties arise, 
especially for the handling of 
information4 2, the capture of the 
regulator by the private sector and 
inefficiency. These basic theories of 
economic regulation are briefly 
discussed below: (1) regulation based 
on public interest (normative approach), 
(2) private interest regulation or 
regulator capture) and, 3) the new 
economy of regulation from the position 
of the new institutional economy.  
4. Methodology 
Aiming to maximize the research and 
provide answer to the problem, we used 
the following methods: 
• Nature – The research was 
theoretical and based on the 
collection of secondary data as well 
as reviewed bibliographies. Again, 
the archival study aimed to improve 
the extant literature in this 
knowledge area. Technical 
dimension involved the use of case 
studies. 
 
4. Findings: Evaluation of Pros & 
Cons 
An evaluation of the efficiency of a 
nationalisation policy requires an 
evaluation of the particular industry’s 
industrial efficiency which requires very 
detailed information and a long time 
scale to collect the data, which are both 
beyond the scope of this project. 
Analysing the energy efficiency of a 
country proved too difficult due to the 
inability to disaggregate the inputs and 
outputs of energy in order to focus 
solely on the energy efficiency of oil 
and natural gas. 
Nationalization 
Pros: 
- It ensures that a government can stay 
homogenized and the economy can 
be nationalized. 
- Increases the chances of 
maximization of state revenues while 
minimizing costs. Reduces the 
likelihood of international retaliation 
and domestic political constraints. 
Cons: 
- Failure due to different political and 
economic objectives between 
government and state officials - 
officials may rely on the natural 
resource revenue to fulfil their 
objectives. 
- Natural resources are often located in 
areas where marginalized minorities 
live who have poorly defined 
property and user rights - 
marginalizing these communities 
further could result in repercussion. 
- Governments suffering from budget 
deficits may have difficulty securing 
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additional capital for the needs of the 
NOC. 
 
Privatization 
Pros: 
- Privately-owned companies run 
businesses more economically and 
efficiently because they are profit 
incentivized to eliminate wasteful 
spending. 
- These companies usually ensure they 
improve their operational efficiency 
in order to reduce their costs and 
improve on profits. 
- Privatization reduces the 
government’s political interference. 
Cons: 
- Government loses out on potential 
dividends after privatization; 
- Exposure to strict local laws, 
regulations, taxes; 
- Increased competition – existence of 
policies to allow more firms to enter 
the industry and increase the 
competitiveness of the market. 
- These companies do not directly 
deliver the government revenue, and 
they also have more freedom to 
pursue their own interests, which 
may negatively affect consumers, 
without government involvement. 
 
 
Comparative Analysis 
The following two case studies are 
drawn from the work of Monaldi 
(2003), and we present them as they 
were initially presented by the author. 
 
Case 1 – Venezuela 
Ever since Venezuela began exporting 
oil in 1917, Venezuelan leaders have 
sought to extract greater compensation. 
In 1943, Venezuela worked out a “50-
50” policy where private companies 
provided half of their profits to the 
Venezuelan government in exchange for 
long-term operating contracts. As time 
progressed, companies had to provide a 
greater share of their profits to 
Venezuela. According to Grayson, by 
the 1970’s this partially nationalized 
system left Venezuela dependent on the 
international economy and aggravated 
income disparities within the country. 
Venezuela’s nationalistic policy was 
altered in 1998 when Venezuela 
increased privatization. After the oil 
boom of the 1970s, Venezuela began 
reform efforts leading to growth of state 
enterprises. These efforts began in 1971, 
when Congress passed the Gas 
Nationalization Law. In this law, 
Venezuela was entitled to collect all 
associated gas for which the 
concessionaire had no economic use for 
at the price of its collection cost. 
Reservoirs of free gas were also 
nationalized. 
In 1973, Congress passed the Domestic 
Market Nationalization Law. Under the 
law, hydrocarbons were considered 
basic commodities. The 1973 law was 
different from the 1971 in that it 
increased the government’s hold over 
the economy rather than expropriate 
concessions as the 1971 law did. The 
state intervened in the domestic market 
to lower prices and protect national 
consumers from rising world market 
prices. Because they were owners of the 
natural resource, national consumers 
were not to be subject to the increase of 
the international ground-rent. 
Venezuelan nationalization occurred on 
January 1, 1976. By the late 1970s, state 
enterprises accounted for 85.9% of all 
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public-sector investment. Globally, 
nationalization had two consequences: 
the collapse of the rent capitalism (the 
rent that foreign companies pay for the 
use of the land in the oil producing host 
country) and the country left on its own 
could not find new energy 
infrastructures (the technological and 
structural capacity necessary for 
efficient energy production and 
distribution). 
The oil-exporting countries raised 
ground-rent and prices which hurt the 
oil-consuming countries. The state 
enterprises were criticized for lacking 
clear objectives, technocratic expertise 
and coordination in planning, and 
unsuccessful implementation and 
evaluation of projects. Lack of control 
over spending of public monies and 
absence of bureaucratic accountability 
led to low-level corruption and 
mismanagement. 
In Venezuela, the assured flow of oil 
revenues to state managers left little 
incentive to maximize efficiency of 
state enterprises. When nationalized, the 
oil industry could not tax multi-
nationals to pay for their mistakes, as 
they could only tax themselves. 
Domestic consumption on a whole was 
a loss to Petroleum de Venezuela, S.A. 
(PDVSA). Prices eventually fell below 
technical costs after 1983. Prices in the 
domestic market were the sole domain 
of the government. Prices were 
disassociated from the international 
market and were lower for domestic 
consumers. Venezuelan consumers as 
resource owners felt they did not have 
to pay ground-rent. 
Furthermore, since the country had 
abundant energy resources, low prices 
were supposed to foster development of 
energy-intensive industries. The 
issuance of low prices made it difficult 
for governments to decide on reasonable 
prices. After 1986, due to 
mismanagement and failure, there was 
no link between fiscal oil revenues and 
development. Thus, in the mid-1990s 
Venezuela made efforts to privatize its 
national industries leading to the Oil 
Aperture policy. 
In 2002, Hugo Chavez, however, took 
political control of PDVSA. He diverted 
funds of PDVSA to finance 
government’s social programs. In 2004 
the job of Energy and Oil Minister and 
PDVSA Chairman became the same 
increasing presidential control of 
company. As a result, PDVSA is 
currently underinvesting (investing 
insufficient amounts to adequately 
perform a task) in exploration and 
production. PDVSA is even 
underinvesting in comparison to other 
state-owned oil companies. 
This recent creeping nationalization that 
Chavez has been employing since he 
took office is seen as an affront to the 
U.S. Chavez is, moreover, using 
Venezuelan oil as a foreign policy 
instrument to form regional alliances 
with his neighbours by offering them 
preferential oil leases. With a possible 
energy crisis ahead, analysts believe that 
Chavez is trying to position Venezuela 
(which has the largest oil reserve in the 
Western Hemisphere) into a spot where 
an energy thirsty world would be forced 
to integrate according to Venezuela’s 
terms. If Venezuela were to stop selling 
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oil to the U.S., an $11 per barrel crude 
oil price spike could result. PDVSA is 
still considered to be one of the most 
successful large national oil companies 
in the Third World. 
 
Case 2 – Bolivia 
On May 1, 2006 Bolivia’s president, 
Evo Morales, issued an executive decree 
(#28701) declaring the “nationalization” 
of Bolivia’s oil and gas reserves. The 
decree was accompanied by a set of 
images aired worldwide of Bolivian 
troops sent to many of the nation’s oil 
fields by Morales to “protect” the 
nation’s oil and gas. 
The popular demand for gas and oil 
nationalization is a long-standing one in 
Bolivia, and has been at the forefront of 
national politics for three years. In July 
2004 more than 90% of the voters in a 
national referendum supported a 
measure to recover control of Bolivia’s 
gas and oil reserves. Nationalization 
was also a central pledge by Morales 
during the 2005 elections. 
In general, foreign media coverage of 
Morales’ announcement has 
significantly overstated what the decree 
actually does, and painted the move as 
one far more radical than is evidenced 
by the content of the decree and the 
government’s actions. This brief seeks 
to explain what the decree actually does 
provide some historical context; discuss 
some of the issues the decree raises; and 
note what developments to watch for in 
the months ahead. 
Bolivia privatized its oil sector in the 
mid-1990. Prior to that, the state owned 
oil company Yacimientos Petrolíferos 
Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) divested 
most of assets. After privatization, 
foreign companies owned most of 
Bolivia’s oil sector. Bolivia also 
privatized its natural gas sector in the 
mid-1990’s which resulted in more 
foreign investment leading to an 
increase in exploration resulting in an 
increase of 600% of proven natural gas 
reserves between 1997 and 2005. In 
May 2006, Morales declared the 
renationalization of the country’s 
hydrocarbon reserves giving control of 
reserves back to YPFB. 
On May 1, 2006 President Morales gave 
the oil companies 180 days to sign new 
contracts with the state guaranteeing 
public control and management of 
activities. He also issued a profit sharing 
arrangement where companies that have 
operation in the biggest fields will 
resign 82% of their profit to the state 
and keep the remainder and companies 
in the smaller fields will resign 60% of 
their profit to the state and retain the 
remaining 40%. 
The Spanish company Repsol-YPF and 
the Brazilian company Petrobras will be 
the companies most affected by 
arrangements in Morales’ proposals for 
nationalization. In the case of Bolivia, 
this recent nationalization of its natural 
gas industry on May 1, 2006 might have 
serious repercussions considering that 
foreign companies accounted for 20% 
of the country’s gross domestic product 
and approximately 20% of its tax 
revenue. Bolivia had previously 
nationalized oil production in 1937 and 
1969. 
However, this time around, Bolivia has 
not kept to its six-month timeline that it 
laid-out to restructure its state oil 
company in its current nationalization 
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process, though it seems likely that 
Bolivia will follow through. One theory 
behind President Morales’s motives is 
that he is trying to embrace a regional 
perspective, combining forces with 
President Chavez of Venezuela, 
ignoring a more global one88. Rising 
earnings from natural gas exports is the 
driver of Bolivia’s economic growth. 
Nationalization reportedly deterred 
foreign investment in natural gas sector 
in 2005 after the approval of a 
referendum calling for renationalization 
of the once state-owned Andina and 
Chaco oil and natural gas operators. The 
referendum also declared greater taxes 
on foreign Hydrocarbon producers. 
Bolivia had 440 million barrels proven 
crude oil reserves in 2006. Bolivia also 
possessed proven natural gas reserves of 
24.0 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) in 2006. It 
produced 64,000 barrels per day of oil 
during the first three-quarters of 2006 
and consumed about 48,000 bbl/d of oil 
in 2006. Bolivia has two refineries but 
both are operated by Petrobras (the 
Brazilian oil company). Due to the 
nationalization decree, YPFB is seeking 
to appropriate the majority stake in both 
refineries. 
Looking at a general picture of 
nationalization, Asher poses a number 
of reasons for why the policy often 
seems to fail. One particular cause for 
the failure is different political and 
economic objectives between 
government and state officials. Even 
among government officials there is 
disunity in objectives. When there is 
such a difference, officials may rely on 
the natural resource revenue to fulfill 
their objectives. 
Furthermore, a problem for natural 
resource extraction regardless of the 
organizational structure is that natural 
resources are often located in areas 
where marginalized minorities live who 
have poorly defined property and user 
rights. Marginalizing these communities 
further could result in a backlash as has 
occurred in Nigeria, where communities 
who have been neglected by the profits 
made from the resource in their land 
demand a greater share of said profit. 
Since officials can easily direct financial 
flows, government officials that are 
trying to increase accountability and 
transparency in the industry find it 
difficult to do so. Thus, many of the 
reasons for nationalization’s failure are 
due to human actions and not 
necessarily policy failures. Even so, 
nationalization enables government and 
state officials to manipulate the 
revenues easier than they would be able 
to if the industry were privatized and 
where financial institutions and 
governance are weak there is no means 
of ensuring proper accounting. 
The difficulty lies in finding the proper 
control measure. Too much government 
control means that a NOC is just an 
extension of civil service, but 
insufficient control means a NOC may 
lose interest in non-commercial 
objectives and become like any oil 
multinational company that focuses 
solely on commercial success but not 
necessarily on a larger socio-economic 
and nationalistic objective. 
However, without competition, a NOC 
may become complacent and lazy and 
develop goals of its own as opposed to 
those which it was created for. It is 
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generally found that NOCs are likely to 
be: overstaffed and pay more than 
market wages, located in politically 
desirable rather than economically 
desirable regions, charge prices either 
significantly below marginal cost to win 
political support or monopolize prices 
when political objectives dictate it to do 
so, lack environmental concern and are 
often the worst polluters. 
Furthermore, NOCs tend to lack 
managerial and technical expertise 
because NOCs recruitment policies are 
more governed by tribal and religious 
considerations than merit. However, the 
inefficiencies of NOCs cannot all be 
blamed on the companies themselves. 
Governments have been found at times 
to provide insufficient resources to 
NOCs hindering the companies’ ability 
to undertake tasks and halting 
production or any increases in 
production. 
Governments suffering from budget 
deficits may have difficulty securing 
additional capital for the needs of the 
NOC. It is difficult to say though, 
whether governments are the culprits for 
the challenges facing NOCs or whether 
NOCs are adversely affecting the 
government. Suffice it to say that both 
the state and the national oil company 
need to work together to achieve 
efficient operations in either entity. 
 
6. Findings 
From the cases of study, we found that 
both states are highly reliant on oil or 
other minerals for their economic, and 
the low human development ratio 
contribute to weak political policies and 
decisions. They also rely on old and 
weak fiscal or regulatory institutions. 
This association with the international 
high prices contributed positively in the 
nationalization of Oil companies in 
Bolivia and Venezuela. In addition to 
the high oil prices, the governments of 
these countries began to act with 
authority in minimizing the freedom of 
expression; thereby fueling extremist 
protests and the power of other 
companies in their soil. Again,  the 
budgeting for public spending on 
education diminished. 
Furthermore, it seems that the 
governments of these countries were 
fooled by high revenues of these 
nationalized companies due to high 
prices of oil, forgetting their main goal 
as a state is  increasing Gross Domestic 
Product and human capital).  and started 
to act more as a company (with the 
single objective of making profit). 
Maybe this is the main reason that the 
Dutch Disease is well known  all over 
the world, especially on underdeveloped 
countries. This is probably the reason 
why many authors consider the Gift of 
Oil as a curse, and it is clearly shown as 
an example here. 
7. Implications 
As a result of the overall instability of 
supply, oil became an instrument of 
foreign policy for oil-exporting 
countries. Nationalization increased the 
stability in the oil markets and broke the 
vertical integration within the system. 
Vertical integration was replaced with a 
dual system where OPEC countries 
controlled upstream activities such as 
the production and marketing of crude 
oil while oil companies controlled 
downstream activities such as 
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transportation, refining, distribution, and 
sale of oil products. 
The nationalization of oil supplies and 
the emergence of the OPEC market 
caused the spot market to change in 
both orientation and size. The spot 
market changed in orientation because it 
started to deal not only with crude oil 
but also with refined products. The spot 
market changed in size because as the 
OPEC market declined the number of 
spot market transactions increased. The 
development of the spot market made 
oil prices volatile. The risks involving 
oil investment increased. To protect 
against these potential risks, parallel 
markets such as the forward market 
developed. 
 
8. Conclusions & Research Agenda 
Although Privatization and 
nationalization are most likely to 
maximize social and local employment 
benefits, it must balance between the 
various objectives of privatization. 
Financial, economic, social and 
technological considerations are an 
essential component of this process. 
They should form an integral part of the 
design and implementation of 
privatization policies and programmes. 
Privatization works most successfully 
where it is backed up by social 
consensus and support and not just 
political or economic will. Therefore, 
whether from the point of view of 
political commitment to giving higher 
priority to social and employment goals 
or from that of creating the right 
environment for the economic success 
of privatization and restructuring 
programmes, it makes sense to 
incorporate the technical, social and 
employment dimensions throughout the 
process, from goal-setting to 
implementation, evaluation and follow-
up. 
Also in parallel it must be built on 
strong fiscal and regulatory institutions. 
These institutions will increase 
transparency and accountability and 
create a check on the government to 
ensure that it does not spend the revenue 
frivolously and ensure that the economy 
is not vulnerable to the volatile nature of 
hydrocarbon prices. 
The resource will still remain under 
domestic control and it is believed that a 
privatized environment with 
competition and no barriers to entry will 
foster transparency and since the 
government will want to tap into the 
revenues of those private organizations 
it will develop rules to regulate the 
private sector. In economics we can find 
various suggestions on how to improve 
Human development and GDPlevels: 
- One is increase production of other 
goods, reducing external 
dependence of the products and 
importations. 
- Investing in education, will create 
an impact on the man force at all 
levels, reducing importation of 
technology and man intelligence; 
- Lead by example by creating very 
rigid and effective politics to 
discourage corruption and 
impunity; 
- Create partnerships and chamber of 
commerce and exchange in various 
areas (education, agricultural 
production, mineral resources, 
etc.). 
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Looking specifically at the experiences 
of both Venezuela and Bolivia, we can 
conclude that the empirical evidence 
presented by Mahdavi apply 
consistently: States are most likely to 
establish NOCs (1) in periods of high 
oil prices, when the risks of 
expropriation are outweighed by the 
financial benefits; (2) in non-democratic 
systems, where executive constraints are 
limited; (3) in “waves”, that is, after 
other countries have nationalized, 
reflecting reduced likelihood of 
international retaliation; and, though 
with weaker empirical support, (4) in 
political settings marked by resource 
nationalism. 
Mahdavi’s statistical findings show that 
results from empirical analysis lend 
strong support for the revenue 
maximization, resource nationalism, and 
diﬀusion (international retaliation) 
hypotheses, and weak to modest support 
for the domestic constraints hypothesis. 
We also keep in mind Erdmann’s 
conclusion that the appetite of 
governments to nationalise or regulate 
energy industries increases with the 
profit rate. He adds that by extrapolating 
the determinants for nationalization and 
privatization, we can predict the 
associated trends for different energy 
sectors and the associated productivity 
developments. Even more important is 
the identification of conditions under 
which trend changes are likely. 
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